Forward-Deployed Engineering · Automotive components · Quality inspection

Case study: visual inspection of machined castings, from lab bench to production line

Illustrative engagement — not a client record. The company, people, volumes and results below are a representative composite, written to show how a forward-deployed engagement runs end to end. The workflow, the architecture, the controls and the method are real and technically valid.

Offering usedPilot-to-ProductionA stalled pilot hardened, integrated and put in front of real users.

Live callIn region

Illustrative results, first 90 days after go-live, in-scope part families only:

  • 100%

    Parts with an image record linked to their serial code

    Before 0%

  • 11 ppm

    Customer-reported defects on in-scope features

    Before 41 ppm

  • 1.3%

    Good parts held for re-inspection

    Before 3.6%

  • under one hour

    Time from a defect spike to a process engineer seeing it

    Before next morning's report

Explainer09 sheets

The whole story in about a minute

Nine short scenes, from the inspection table to the results. Press play, or pick a scene.

View ABy eye

Parts at the table

About 7,000 housings a day

41 ppm
  1. Escaped
Every shiftThree shifts a dayUnder 2 in 100 had a defect
2 inspectors a shiftcustomer-reported defects, before
41ppm of customer-reported defects on in-scope features

Sheet01 / 09

ClockBefore

Title

Every part was checked by eye, under a lamp.

About 7,000 housings a day, two inspectors per shift. Defects were rare, so they were hard to see, and some still reached the customer.

Notes
  1. 1.About 7,000 housings a day
  2. 2.Two inspectors per shift
  3. 3.Under 2 in 100 parts had a defect
FDE / 00

At a glance

Client
A tier-one supplier of aluminium die-cast and machined housings for steering and braking systems, one plant, two machining lines, IATF 16949 certified
Workflow
End-of-line visual inspection of machined housings: image each part, find surface defects and missing features, send it to pass, reject lane or a human inspector, and record every decision against the part's serial code
Engagement
Pilot-to-Production (ten weeks, plus six working days of paused clock)
Team
One named senior forward-deployed engineer, full time, with a second engineer for the three integration weeks. Client side: the Plant Quality Head (owner), a controls engineer, the MES analyst, two senior inspectors, an OT security reviewer
Where it runs
On an inspection computer at the station, inside the plant network. Images and records stay on the plant's own servers
Handover
Runbook executed by the client's controls engineer in week ten; our access revoked the same day
Illustrative results, first 90 days after go-live, in-scope part families only:
MeasureBeforeAfter
Parts with an image record linked to their serial code0%100%
Customer-reported defects on in-scope features41 ppm11 ppm
Good parts held for re-inspection3.6%1.3%
Time from a defect spike to a process engineer seeing itnext morning's reportunder one hour
Parts released by the model that a rule would have heldnot applicable0, by design

FDE / 01Case study

01 / 12

The situation

In shortPeople checked every part by eye, and rare defects still reached the customer.

The plant machined around 7,000 aluminium housings a day across two lines and three shifts. After machining and washing, every part passed an inspection table. Two inspectors per shift turned each housing under a lamp and looked at the sealing faces, the bores, the threads and the cross-drilled holes.

They were looking for four things: porosity opened up by machining on a sealing face, cracks near the mounting bosses, burrs left inside cross-drilled holes, and missing features such as an untapped thread or a skipped hole. Most days, fewer than two parts in a hundred had any of them.

The cost showed up in three places:

  • Escapes. The customer returned parts with porosity on a sealing face or a burr in an oil passage several times a quarter. Each complaint meant a containment, a sort at the customer's plant and a formal corrective action report.

  • Traceability. When a complaint arrived, the plant could say which shift inspected the batch. It could not show what that particular part had looked like when it left.

  • People. Inspection is tiring and rare defects are the hardest to see. Inspectors held good parts when in doubt, and a second person re-checked them at the end of the shift.

FDE / 02Case study

02 / 12

Why the first attempt stalled

In shortA vision pilot did well on a lab bench, but failed on the real line within two shifts.

Eighteen months earlier the plant's innovation cell had run a vision pilot. On a lab bench, with a ring light and 3,000 hand-picked images, it reported 97% accuracy. It was installed on line one for a week and switched off after two shifts. The reasons are common rather than unusual:

  1. The bench was not the line. On the line, wet parts came straight from the washer, a roll-up door and roof lights changed the ambient light through the day, and the fixture let each part sit a little differently. In its first shift the pilot sent four in ten good parts to the reject bin.

  2. Accuracy was the wrong number. With defects under 2% of parts, a model that passes everything is 98% accurate. Nobody had measured how many real defects it missed, by defect type.

  3. It was not connected to anything. Decisions appeared on a screen. The reject gate, the MES and the part's serial code were all "phase two".

  4. It had no owner. The pilot belonged to the innovation cell, not to the Quality Head. When it was switched off, nobody was accountable for switching it back on.

The model architecture was reasonable. Lighting, integration, evaluation and ownership were not.

FDE / 03Case study

03 / 12

Assessment and go-live criteria (weeks one and two)

In shortTwo weeks on the shop floor, ending in signed, measurable rules for going live.

The engineer spent the first two weeks on the shop floor: three shifts beside the inspectors, two days with the controls engineer at the line PLC, and time with the MES analyst and the quality engineers who handle complaints.

What was found:

FIG. 3.1
  • Lighting was the real work. A test with a dark cloth over the station showed that most of the pilot's false rejects came from reflections and water spots, not from the model. The station needed an enclosure, a dome light for the faces, low-angle light for burrs and cracks, and an air knife to dry the part.
  • A false assumption. Everyone believed the part's laser-marked serial code was read at inspection. It was read only at packing. Without a code reader at the station, no image could be tied to a part.
  • Two foundries. Castings came from the plant's own foundry and from an outside supplier. The supplier's parts were shot-blasted and looked different on unmachined surfaces.
  • The defect catalogue existed. The customer had approved limit samples for each defect type: the largest pore, the smallest burr, that could be accepted. That catalogue became the backbone of the evaluation.
FIG. 3.26 CRITERIA

The gap report and go-live criteria, signed by the Plant Quality Head:

FieldValue
  1. WorkflowEnd-of-line inspection of the two highest-volume housing families on both lines: machined faces, bores, threads and cross-drilled holes
  2. Out of scopeUnmachined as-cast cosmetic surfaces, internal porosity that does not reach a surface, dimensional measurement
  3. MetricZero misses on the seeded critical defects in the golden set, and a false-hold rate below 2% of good parts
  4. OwnerPlant Quality Head
  5. GuardrailsThe model never releases a part a deterministic rule would hold. Stopping the line stays with the shift supervisor. Inspectors audit a sample of passed parts every shift
  6. Go-live criteriaConnected to the PLC and the MES; scored on the golden set; OT security review signed; monitoring live with a named person paged; rollback rehearsed; controls engineer trained
SIGNED · W2

Timeline09 stations

The engagement, stage by stage

Nine stages on one clock, from the bench pilot to ninety days after go-live. Press play, or pick a stage.

LineStopped

StationOP 10 By eye

ClockBefore

Work instructionOP 10 · 01 / 09

Every part was checked by eye, under a lamp.

About 7,000 housings a day, two inspectors per shift. Defects were rare, so they were hard to see, and some still reached the customer.

Output41ppm of customer-reported defects on in-scope features
Steps
  1. About 7,000 housings a day
  2. Two inspectors per shift
  3. Under 2 in 100 parts had a defect

FDE / 04Case study

04 / 12

The engagement, week by week

In shortTen weeks, plus six days paused for the enclosure: light it, connect it, test it, switch it on, hand it over.

FIG. 4.1W1 – W10

plus six working days of paused clock

W1Assess

What happened

Engineer on all three shifts; pilot code and images read; access requested for the PLC, MES and plant servers. First pull request merged on day seven: the pilot's code moved into the client's source control with its first tests

What existed at the end

A first gap report and a list of what to keep: the pilot's defect classes and its image labelling tool

  • What happened

    Engineer on all three shifts; pilot code and images read; access requested for the PLC, MES and plant servers. First pull request merged on day seven: the pilot's code moved into the client's source control with its first tests

    What existed at the end

    A first gap report and a list of what to keep: the pilot's defect classes and its image labelling tool

plus six working days of paused clock

Calendar time was ten weeks and six working days. The six days were the enclosure. They were recorded when they happened, not explained at the end.

FDE / 05Case study

05 / 12

What was built

In shortA station that images every part, checks rules before models, and sends doubts to a person.

Try a part07 ops

Pick a part. Watch where the station sends it.

The same station checks every housing. What the images show decides whether it passes, goes to the reject lane or goes to a person.

Pass07 / 07

Pass

Passed

The part moves on, and its images stay linked to its serial code.

FIG. 5.1Call path

  1. Capture. When the PLC signals that a part is clamped, four cameras image it under a dome light and a low-angle ring, with the part rotated to show each face. The enclosure blocks ambient light, and an air knife dries the part first. Lighting and optics were designed with the controls engineer; the software cannot fix an image the light did not produce.

  2. Image checks. Deterministic checks run before any model sees the image: exposure within limits, focus score above threshold, part present and seated correctly, serial code read. If any check fails, the part goes to a human inspector. A bad picture is never a pass.

  3. Feature rules. Classical vision rules, not a learned model, confirm that each hole and thread exists where the drawing says it should. A missing feature is a hold, whatever any model says.

  4. Defect models. Two models run side by side. A supervised detector finds the known defect types in the machined zones: porosity, cracks, burrs. An anomaly model, trained only on good parts, scores how unusual each zone looks. It exists for the defect nobody has labelled yet.

  5. Decide. Three outcomes only:

    • Pass, when every image check and feature rule passes, the detector finds nothing above its threshold and the anomaly score is below its threshold.

    • Human inspector, with the images, the zone and the reason, when anything is uncertain: a score in the grey band, an anomaly with no known defect type, an image check failure, or a casting lot from a supplier not yet in the golden set.

    • Reject lane, when the detector finds a known defect in a critical zone above its reject threshold. Rejected parts are quarantined. A quality engineer decides whether each is scrap, rework or a false reject.

    The order matters. Rules are evaluated first. A model score can move a part from pass towards the inspector or the reject lane. It can never move a part a rule holds towards pass.

  6. Records. For every part the MES receives the serial code, the images, each rule result, each score, the model version and the outcome, including what an inspector later decided. Records follow the plant's existing retention policy for quality records.

  7. Trends. Every hour, rejects and holds are grouped by zone, die, cavity and shift. When porosity on one sealing face rises for one die, the process engineer sees it that hour, not in the next morning's report.

  8. Line stop. The system never stops the line. When three rejects of the same type arrive within twenty parts, it alerts the shift supervisor with the images. The supervisor decides.

System map20 objects

How the pieces connect

The station, the rules, the models and the people around them, lit one scene at a time. Press play, or pick an event.

OntologyVisual inspectionBy eye

20objects02selected01eventsZoom142%

Graph01 / 09

0107021408031509041610051711061218131920HousingPart · serial codeInspection tableStation · 2 inspectors a shift

Description

Every part was checked by eye, under a lamp.

About 7,000 housings a day, two inspectors per shift. Defects were rare, so they were hard to see, and some still reached the customer.

TimelinePaused01 / 09

FDE / 06Case study

06 / 12

How "right" was defined

In shortA test of 9,400 part images that every release must pass with zero missed seeded defects.

The golden set was the most important thing the engagement produced.

FIG. 6.1GOLDEN SET
  1. 9,400 part images from both lines, all three shifts, both foundries and both housing families, captured under the new enclosure. Nothing from the lab bench was reused.

  2. Answers from two senior inspectors, labelling independently, with a quality engineer settling every disagreement against the customer's limit samples.

  3. Seeded critical defects. Forty physical parts with known porosity, cracks, burrs and missing features, each imaged many times in different positions. The criterion was zero misses. The same parts now run through the station at the start of every shift, as a daily check that the inspection still works.

  4. Scored by defect type, not by accuracy. For each type the harness reports how many real defects were caught and how many good parts were held. With defects this rare, a single accuracy figure hides exactly the misses that matter.

  5. An agreement study. The system's decisions were compared with the inspectors' on the same parts, using the same attribute agreement method the plant already used for its human inspectors.

The suite runs in the client's CI. A release that misses any seeded defect, or that raises false holds above the threshold, fails the build.

FIG. 6.2CI · REPLAY HARNESS
  1. IF misses any seeded defectBLOCKS
  2. IF raises false holds above the thresholdBLOCKS

fails the build

It earned its place in week six. During the shadow run, the drift monitor flagged that anomaly scores had risen on parts from the outside foundry. A new batch had a coarser shot-blast finish. The anomaly model was treating texture as a defect, and false holds on those parts had tripled. Nobody retrained anything quietly. The golden set was extended with 600 images from that supplier, the thresholds were re-scored, and until the new release passed, every part from that supplier's lots went to a human inspector by rule.

FDE / 07Case study

07 / 12

Security and control

In shortEverything stays in the plant, and models flag while rules and people decide.

FIG. 7.1Controls
  1. Perimeter. Inference runs on an inspection computer at the station. Images and records stay on the plant's servers. Training runs on a plant server with a GPU. Nothing leaves the site.

  2. Network. The inspection computer sits in the plant's OT zone. It reads one PLC signal and writes one: the lane decision. It has no write access to any other controller. MES writes go through the MES's own interface as a service account.

    Can

    • reads one PLC signal
    • writes one: the lane decision

    Cannot

    • write access to any other controller
  3. Identity. Our engineers' access went through the client's identity provider and a jump host, appeared in their audit log like anyone else's, and was revoked at handover.

  4. Autonomy is bounded. Models flag; rules and people decide. A model never releases a part a rule holds. Line stops stay with the shift supervisor. Scrap decisions stay with a quality engineer. Inspectors audit one passed part in every two hundred, and every first part after a changeover or a die change.

  5. Review. The OT security reviewer approved the design in week five and the deployment in week eight. Findings and how each was closed are in the decision record.

FDE / 08Case study

08 / 12

Go-live

In shortA two-week shadow run, then one line at a time, with one switch back to the manual table.

The shadow run was the gate. For two weeks the system decided every part while the inspectors worked as before, and each disagreement was reviewed the next morning with the senior inspectors. Disagreements fell into three piles: the system was wrong, the inspector was wrong, and the limit sample was unclear. The third pile went to the Quality Head and the customer's quality contact as questions about the catalogue.

FIG. 8.1SHADOW CALLS

For two weeks

  1. the system was wrong

  2. the inspector was wrong

  3. the limit sample was unclear

    went to the Quality Head and the customer's quality contact as questions about the catalogue

Several parts in the second pile were real burrs the inspectors had missed. Those images went into the golden set too.

Go-live went by line: line one first, line two four days later, each after a clean day of seeded-part checks and audit samples. During the first two weeks inspectors stayed at the table and re-checked every pass on a sample of shifts. Rollback was one switch that sent every part back to the manual table. It was rehearsed in week seven and never needed.

FIG. 8.2LIVE CALLS
  1. 01line one first

  2. 02line two four days later

EACH STEP · a clean day of seeded-part checks and audit samples

FDE / 09Case study

09 / 12

Handover

In shortThe client's controls engineer proved they could run it before we left.

The engagement ended on the go-live criteria, not on the calendar.

FIG. 9.1HANDOVER MANIFEST · 6 ITEMS
ItemWhat the client holds
The repositoryCapture, image checks, rules, models, decision logic and MES integration, every commit in their source control
The evaluation suiteThe golden set, the seeded-part images, the harness and the drift monitor, wired into CI
The runbookRelease, rollback, retraining, adding a housing family, adding a casting supplier, cleaning and re-checking the optics, what to do when the seeded-part check fails
The decision recordEach choice, dated: why rules come before models, why two models, why the reject lane quarantines instead of scrapping
The accounts and keysAll under the client's identity provider; no standing access for us
The trained ownersThe controls engineer owns releases and the station; a quality engineer owns thresholds and the golden set

In the dry run, the controls engineer added images from a new die, scored a retrained model against the golden set, released it, and rolled it back. Our engineer was in the room but not at the keyboard. The runbook was signed after that, not before.

Key numbers09 gauges

The story in nine numbers

One number for each scene, from 41 ppm of defects reaching the customer to 11. Press play, or pick a number.

ClusterStopped

ChannelOP 10 By eye

ClockBefore

DialOP 10

41

ppm of customer-reported defects on in-scope features

ClockBefore

Face01 / 09

Three shifts

01020304050607

ReadoutOP 10

Every part was checked by eye, under a lamp.

About 7,000 housings a day, two inspectors per shift. Defects were rare, so they were hard to see, and some still reached the customer.

Signals

About 7,000 housings a dayTwo inspectors per shiftUnder 2 in 100 parts had a defect

FDE / 10Case study

10 / 12

Results

In shortFewer defects reaching the customer, fewer good parts held, and a picture of every part.

Figures are illustrative, measured on the in-scope housing families over the first 90 days after go-live.

FIG. 10.1RESULTS
  1. Every part has an image record tied to its serial code. A complaint now starts with the pictures of the part that left, not with a shift roster.

  2. Customer-reported defects on in-scope features fell from 41 ppm to 11. Most of the gain was burrs in cross-drilled holes, which people found hard to see and the low-angle light shows clearly.

  3. Good parts held for re-inspection fell from 3.6% to 1.3%. Holds now arrive with the zone and the image, so re-inspection takes seconds.

  4. Defect spikes reach process engineers within the hour. Twice in the first quarter, rising porosity on one die was traced to a vacuum fault in the foundry the same shift.

  5. No part released against a rule, because the design does not allow it.

  6. No inspectors were removed. They now review held parts, run the seeded checks and audit passes. One senior inspector owns the defect catalogue.

What did not improve, and was never promised:

FIG. 10.2
  • Porosity below the surface is still invisible to a camera. The leak test and the sampled X-ray remain exactly as they were.

  • As-cast cosmetic surfaces are still inspected by eye. They were out of scope, and the gap report said so.

  • Parts from the outside foundry still go to a human more often than the plant's own castings. The supplier's finish varies by batch, and no model change removed that.

FDE / 11Case study

11 / 12

What we would tell the next client

In shortSix rules for anyone putting vision inspection on a real line.

FIG. 11.16 LESSONS
  1. Fix the light before you train anything.

    Most of the stalled pilot's errors were reflections. An enclosure did more than any model later would.

  2. Never report accuracy on rare defects.

    Count misses by defect type and good parts held. Nothing else tells you whether the line is safe.

  3. Collect images on the real line.

    A lab bench teaches the model the lab.

  4. Plan for a new supplier, a new die and a dirty lens.

    Drift is not an if. Decide in advance who sees it and what the rule does meanwhile.

  5. Keep rules in front of models.

    It is what made the security review and the customer's questions short.

  6. Pause the clock in writing.

    A late enclosure is not a slip if both sides recorded it the day it happened.

FDE / 12Case study

12 / 12

What happened next

In shortThe client took it in-house, extended it themselves, and came back for a leak-test station.

The client took the system in-house and did not buy managed operations. Their controls engineer extended it to a third housing family using the runbook and the harness. They returned for a Production Sprint on a leak-test station nearby, where the question is different: reading pressure-decay curves rather than images.

FDE / ENDStart

Eight to twelve weeks,and the pilot is in production.

Book a scoping call and bring the pilot; you leave knowing what stands between it and real users.